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Abstract 
 
This article discusses the primary structures Johannes Althusius’ 
constitutionalism, as explained in his Politica: Politics Methodically Set 
Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples published in 1603. 
The first of these structures and the theme that Althusius is most famous 
for, is his scheme of grand republican federalism. The second is the public 
office of the ephors. The discussion is not primarily historical, however. The 
main aim, instead, is to assess the potential relevance of Althusius’ thinking 
for present-day constitutionalism. After centuries of at best scant relevance 
owing to the dominance of the statist paradigm in constitutional doctrine 
and practice, the decline of this paradigm is now creating considerable new 
interest in Althusius’ thinking. 
The discussion starts off with a concise account of the statist paradigm, 
which was at its advent in Althusius’ days. Thereafter follows an exposition 
of his federalism which consists of a set of associations, beginning with the 
closest-knit association, namely the family, spiralling out into the most 
encompassing association, which is the commonwealth or realm, with 
collegia, cities and provinces in between. The office of the supreme 
magistrate is dealt with under this heading. This discussion also focusses 
pertinently on the question of sovereignty, which in Althusian 
conceptualisation was a diffuse popular sovereignty in contrast to that of 
his statist opponents, more specifically Jean Bodin, and in posterity, 
Thomas Hobbes. 
Then follows an assessment of the public office of the (council of the) 
ephors, which assists the supreme magistrate in executing his 
responsibilities in accordance with the law and the covenant between the 
commonwealth and the magistrate and serves a as counterbalance of 
authority and power against the sovereign. 
Against this backdrop Althusius’ constitutional thinking is evaluated. First, 
his constitutionalism is placed in historical context in contrast to (1) classical 
polis-based thought; (2) medieval imperial thinking and (3) modern statist 
constitutionalism. Secondly, Althusius’ communitarian anthropology, which 
is in part the basis for his federalism, and which constitutes an anticipatory 
response to liberal individualism is assessed. Lastly it is argued that 
Althusius’ federalism provides a valuable source for improving on the state-
departmentalisation of power separation and checks and balances, 
currently still sway in terms of the statist paradigm. 
Keywords 
Statist paradigm, State-departmentalisation, republican federalism, ephors, 
family, collegia, cities, provinces, commonwealth or realm, diffuse 
sovereignty, communitarian constitutionalism. 
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1 Introduction 
After centuries of being considered to be of at best marginal importance, 
considerable interest has of late arisen in the thinking of Johannes Althusius 
outlined in his 1603 work entitled Politica: Politics Methodically Set Forth and 
Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples.1 Over the past almost four 
hundred years our political and constitutional thinking and practice have been 
dominated by statism, which took shape within the framework set by the 
territorial state. Recently the dominance of the territorial state and statism have 
decreased considerably, thus making Althusius' comprehensive anticipatory 
alternative for a post-statist constitutionalism particularly informative. Althusian 
constitutionalism is expressed in his grand scheme of republican federalism. 
Althusius' work is divided (acknowledging that these aspects of his work are 
closely interlinked) into the general tenets of his constitutionalism on the one 
hand and the structures of his constitutionalism on the other.  
I refer in this article to Althusius' constitutional thinking or Althusius' 
constitutionalism, because Althusius conceived of a comprehensive 
constitutional order in which core constitutional concepts (as in constitutional 
discourse) such as the pursuit of justice, sovereignty, subsidiarity, federalism, 
control and balance of power, checks and balances, the notion of the mixed 
(and balanced) constitution and public office all enjoyed prominence. I state 
this preference fully realising that the terms constitution and constitutionalism 
were not known in the lexicon of the public, more specifically the political 
discourse in Althusius' times. The essential ingrerdients of constitutionalism as 
referred to in the present discussion are: the quest for a just polity; the notion 
of fundamentality, that is that the constitution (not necessairily in textual/written 
form) represents law of a higher status; the rule of law, mainly based on 
consensus; and the notion of the division – the diffusion – and the limitation 
and balance of power; and mutual checks and balances. 
A previous discussion2 scrutinised these general tenets, namely Althusius's 
thinking on (1) piety, justice and community; (2) covenant (or contract); (3) 
supremacy of the commonwealth and of the law; and (4) political authority and 
public office. The main focus of the present discussion is the structural side of 
Althusian thinking, namely his system of republican federalism and the position 
of the ephors. (The meaning of the term ephors is discussed in detail in section 
4 of this article.)  
                                            
  Koos Malan. BAHons (UP), BIur LLB LLD (UNISA). Professor of Public Law, University 
of Pretoria. Email: Koos.malan@up.ac.za. 
1  Althusius Politica; Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design". 
2  See Malan 2017 PELJ. 
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Althusius' thinking represents the beginning of a counter-tradition in 
constitutional thought, sharply at variance with that which underpins the 
modern (territorial) statist tradition (or paradigm) of political thought (statism) 
as articulated by the founders (and latter exponents) of the statist tradition, 
namely thinkers such as Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx3 and innumerable other followers who have 
been active within the confines of this paradigm. In order to develop a clear 
understanding of Althusius' thinking, it needs to be contrasted with statism, that 
is, with the statist paradigm which has dominmated political and constitutional 
thinking over the past almost four hundred years. In a previous discussion, on 
the general tenets of Althusius' thinking, the statist paradigm was dealt with in 
considerable detail.4 Hence, only a very brief account of statistm will be given 
in part 2 of the present discussion. Thereafter, in part 3, Althusius' federal 
scheme is discussed. The position of the ephors is dealt with in part 4. The 
discussion concludes with a fairly extensive assessment of Althusius' place in 
political and constitutional theory, and this is followed by an appraisal of the 
value of Althusian thinking for contemporary constitutionalism. 
2 Statism 
The statist paradigm or statism has dominated modern constitutional thinking 
since the advent of the territorial state5 in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Thus, the territorial state has defined the framework for political 
thought not only in academic disciplines such as constitutional law and political 
science, but also in public discourse in general. Statism also signifies that 
people adopt and cherish only one public identity, namely an individual identity 
in the image of the state, that is, a statist identity.6 
Statism recognises only two entities, namely the state and the individual: the 
state is a centralised power apparatus maintaining the public peace among 
antagonistic individuals with no public identity other than their identity as 
citizens of the state, that is, other than their statist identity. Statism does not 
recognise or tolerate any other identity aside from a statist identity made up by 
the homogenised collection of all inhabitants of the state, and is antagonistic 
towards any community which is not a statist community. By the same token it 
rejects any apparatus of political authority apart from the state, or more 
specifically power apparatuses between the individual and the state. Such 
non-statist authority would be anathema to the statist paradigm since it is 
inimical to the very stability of the statist order itself. Statism proceeds from the 
                                            
3  On this topic see Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 201; See also Malan 2014 Tydskr 
Geesteswet 462-480. 
4  Malan 2017 PELJ 1-31 
5  See in this regard Malan Politiocracy 43-50 and the sources cited there. 
6  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 201. Also see Malan Politiocracy ch 6. 
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premises of the fundamental absence of any real human community and of 
fundamentally antagonistic relations between abstract atomistic individuals 
combined with the state, as the centralised sovereign political force, 
encapsulated in the legislative, executive and adjudicatory apparatus which 
has to keep the public peace. All individuals are considered to be essentially 
the same, and any differences that might exist between them are held to be 
more apparent than real and politically of no moment.  
Statism requires public identity to be monopolised for the benefit of the state. 
In consequence, only one community is recognised, namely a statist 
community comprising of all who find themselves within the boundaries of the 
territorial state and regardless of whether there exist any real bonds of culture, 
language, ethnicity or religion. 
Thus viewed, the statist community is no real community at all but just a mass; 
any aggregate of persons or, in the words of John Locke,7 any number of men. 
In pursuance of statism there is a strict intolerance of any non-statist 
community, that is, any community of a cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious 
nature which claims public recognition. In terms of a raft of programmes of 
homogenisation such communities are liquidated into a single uniform statist 
mass-society. To the extent that statism does tolerate such communities, they 
have to operate strictly in the private sphere, enjoying no public recognition or 
constitutional authority. In the final analysis the operative concepts of statist 
identity are homogenisation and uniformity – voluntary if possible, but forcible 
if needs be.8 
Since statism recognises but a single centralised power apparatus, no power 
should be vested in any institution other than the power apparatus of the 
centralised state. Federalism, the devolution of power, the formation of 
communities or any other mechanism that could dilute the centralisation of 
power is opposed. To the extent that such mechanisms might in limited 
circumstances be tolerated, such toleration is basically an anomaly to statism. 
The two elements of statism – the abstract individual with his statist identity 
and the centralised power apparatus of the territorial state – determine the way 
in which all matters of public life are conceptualised, these including crucial 
concepts such the constitution, constitutionalism, the rule of law and the 
Rechtstaat, sovereignty, citizenship, democracy, rights, and power. 
                                            
7  Locke of Civil Government para 89. See the insightful comments on this by Van Dyke 
1976-77 World Politics 343-369 and Van Dyke 1974 Am J Pol Sci 725-741. 
8  It is significant to note that the onslaught on non-dominant communities prevails over 
the entire ideological spectrum – left, right and centre (liberal) as it were. The common 
denominator of all these anti-community trends is statism. In this regard see Malan 2014 
Tydskr Geesteswet 462-480. 
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The territorial state takes centre stage in statist thinking on constitutional law. 
In consequence the statist tradition also does not take any particular interest 
in political and constitutional thinking that does not share statism's fundamental 
assumptions. It is fixated on the state and the individual, thus ignoring and 
often justifying even pernicious policies for the destruction of communities9 and 
any other intermediary entity between the state and the individual or in place 
of the state. To the extent that it may be making concessions to such entities, 
it does so strictly within the confines of statist thinking.10 
The statist tradition is distinctively positivist in that the existing territorial states 
have set the paradigm within which political and constitutional thinking have 
taken place over many centuries since the dawn of the territorial state.11 
Moreover, the dominant concepts and themes of reflection in the field of 
constitutional law and political philosophy as well as in political practice are all 
statist in nature, that is, conditioned by and safeguarded for the territorial state. 
The accepted meaning of these concepts serves the specific needs of the 
territorial state.12 
The thinking of Althusius is a distinctive alternative to statism. His thinking 
represents a wide-ranging world view which is the subject matter of his 
constitutional thinking. In this frame of thought Althusius synthesised the 
experience of the Holy Roman Empire with the political ideas of the covenant 
theology of Reformed Protestantism.13 He drew extensively from the 
Decalogue and other Biblical sources,14 and the philosophical, theological and 
juridical sources in the broader Roman Catholic tradition as it had emerged 
though the Medieval era. His thinking was also profoundly informed by 
Classical (non-religious) sources. Hence, he identified natural law with the 
second table of the Decalogue.15 Having drawn considerably from Aristotle, 
Althusius was also an Aristotelian par excellence.16 In the premises it may be 
asserted that Althusius was the quintessential Christian humanist, who 
amalgamated Christian doctrine and humanist thinking into a single (logically) 
comprehensive system of thought. The very title of his work bears the best 
testimony to that, because what he consistently and thoroughly did was in 
                                            
9  Van Dyke 1974 Am J Pol Sci 726. See further Pestieau 1991 Can J Law Jurisprud 369-
370. 
10  See for example the discussion of self-determination by Malan Politiocracy 246-267. 
11  This is one of the main themes of Nisbet's discussion in his 1990 Quest for Community. 
12  See for example Malan Politocracy 175, 197 and generally ch 5-9. 
13  Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design" xxxv. 
14  There are no less than two thousand quotations according to Hueglin's count. Hueglin 
Early Modern Concepts 56. 
15  Sabine History of Political Theory 416-417. Althusius is in step here with a broad 
phenomenon of his time. Hugo de Groot had the same convictions. Also see De Benoist 
2000 Telos 47-48. 
16  Sabine History of Political Theory 417. 
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exact accordance with  the title of his book, namely to methodically set forth 
and illustrate his politics with both sacred and profane examples. 
Althusius' Christian humanist view also accounts for his rejection (in 
anticipation) of the modernist, more in particular the Hobbesian view of the 
essential absence of human community and the assertion instead that people 
are basically atomist, pursuing only their own interests and finding themselves 
fundamentally in a relationship of animosity with all other individuals. In 
contrast to the (individualist) nominalism, communities are in Althusius' view 
prior to individuals (individual members).17 
Apart from being an exponent of the late medieval vision of society, Althusius 
may be viewed as an exponent of post-modern and post-statist federalism, 
which accounts not only for individual rights but also, very importantly, for the 
existence and claims of communities to which juridical and political rights must 
be attributed in the public sphere.18 Althusius exerted influence between the 
medieval and modern eras. He is quite justifiably considered as the person 
who discovered most of the key elements of federalism.19 
The domination of statism has just about silenced the voice of Althusius for 
more than three centuries, but now that intellectual and material forces are 
causing increased pressure to bear upon the territorial state and on statism, 
Althusius is once again enjoying prominence on the stage of constitutional and 
political theory. 
However, Althusius represents much more than that. His ideas set the basis 
for a tradition of constitutional thinking in direct opposition to the statist tradition 
in general. Not only were his ideas partly in direct opposition to those of Jean 
Bodin20 but they also assumed the nature of a wide-ranging anticipatory 
response and present an alternative to the concepts that in time became 
fundamental traits of statism. 
3 The contours of Althusius' compound constitution of 
republican federalism 
Althusius is best known for his federalism.21 He is in fact often viewed as the 
founder of the federal idea in modern political thinking.22 Federalism brings us 
                                            
17  De Benoist 2000 Telos 32. 
18  De Benoist 2000 Telos 54. 
19  De Benoist 2000 Telos 54. 
20  Althusius is in debate with Bodin at various places, eg Althusius Politica 72, 105, 130, 
149, 173. 
21  Even though he never used the word federalism himself - Hueglin Early Modern 
Concepts 2. 
22  Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design" xxxvii. 
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to the core of Althusius' constitutionalism. For two reasons it can be viewed as 
macro-constitutionalism because it deals not only with the workings of one part 
of the comprehensive constitutional order and commonwealth but also with the 
commonwealth as a whole, inclusive of all its composite elements, each with 
an integrity of its own. Federalism would best secure justice through the 
separation and balance of authority that has to be exercised in the interest of 
the whole of the citizenry. 
Althusian federalism consists of a set of associations, beginning with the 
smallest association, namely the family, spiralling out into the most 
encompassing association, namely the commonwealth or realm (empire). 
Between the family and the empire are collegia, the cities and provinces, with 
the ecclesiastical associations also forming a distinctive part of the larger 
encompassing constitutional order. The order is built up from below, that is, 
from the smallest to the most encompassing entity, not the other way around. 
The smaller can still exist without the larger ones, but the more encompassing 
structures are not viable without the smaller ones. At the end of Politica 
Althusius declares as follows: 
For this is the order and progression of nature, that the conjugal relationship, or 
the domestic association of man and wife, is called the beginning and foundation 
of human society. From it are then produced the associations of various blood 
relations and in-laws. From then in turn come the soladities and collegia, out of 
the union of which arises the composite body that we call a village, town or city. 
And these symbiotic associations as the first to develop can subsist by 
themselves even without a province or realm. However, as long as they are not 
in the united in the associated and symbiotic universal body of a province, 
commonwealth, or realm, they are deprived from many of the advantages and 
necessary support of life. It is necessary, therefore, that the doctrine of the 
symbiotic life of families, kinship associations, collegia, cities and provinces 
precede the doctrine of universal symbiotic association that arises from the 
former associations and is composed of them. In practice, however, all these 
associations are to be joined together for the common welfare of the symbiotes 
both individually and corporately. For the public association cannot exist without 
the private and domestic association. Both are necessary and useful in order that 
we may live advantageously.23 
From this citation it is evident that Althusius' is a holistic but bottom-up 
constitutionalism24 that provides for the pluralisation of government among the 
members of a commonwealth in which all higher levels of authority are as a 
matter of principle constituted on the basis of consent from below.25 What 
Althusius set out to do was to develop a constitutional vision of a compound 
                                            
23  Althusius Politica 207-208. 
24  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 129. 
25  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 153. Althusius' views on representation were 
consonant with his federal system. In line with the thinking of Marsilius of Padua he 
advocated what Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 136-151 described as an ascending 
and not a descending concept of representation. 
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polity which would combine local autonomy and universal coordination26 – 
local autonomy on the basis of subsidiarity, and universal co-ordination on the 
basis of solidarity. On the one hand he sought to maintain the autonomy of the 
plural order against the rising tide of territorialism and against contemporary 
theorists such as Jean Bodin. Autonomy, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity,27 was in fact the default, normal or standard position. At the same 
time, however, he conceived of a multitiered constitutional system - a 
community (the commonwealth) of multiple communities. The particular 
communities were sustained by consent among their constituent members, 
and the universal community – the commonwealth – was created and 
sustained from below, namely by the smaller communities. All communities 
were interconnected by universal principles of association, representation, and 
sovereignty. His system provided for shared or co-sovereignty that was divided 
up from the smallest fellowship to the universal commonwealth28 (in sharp 
contrast to the notion of unilateral and undivided state sovereignty of the 
incipient unitary territorial state). Accordingly, there should be balanced power-
sharing among different constituent communities. The particular interests are 
clearly autonomous but not sovereign on their own and somehow completely 
separated from other particular interests. They are bound together in the 
universality of the common enterprise, encapsulated in the encompassing 
commonwealth. Following the subsidiarity principle, all particular powers 
should be allocated at the lowest possible level of responsibility. At the same 
time, as Hueglin pointed out, these powers are still limited according to 
universal standards of solidarity.29 
This line of thought has classical roots. It echoes the notion of the polis, active 
citizenship and self-government. At the same time it resonates with the 
medieval constitutional structure of Western Europe, with its wide variety of 
private and public associations and autonomous legal systems, which included 
the legal orders of the manors, feudal structures, rudimentary kingdoms, the 
cities, the church, and finally the empire, each having its own legal system and 
jurisdiction,30 but together making up one comprehensive worldly and spiritual 
whole (a totality), that is, one Republica Christiana.31 At the same time, it also 
accounts for the developments of Althusius' own times, such as the chasm in 
the Western church and the rising tide of territorialism which was bound soon 
                                            
26  See Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 41. 
27  Even though, as Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 152 noted, Althusius never used the 
term subsidiarity. 
28  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 61, 65. 
29  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 129. 
30  See the wide-raging discussion by Berman Law and Revolution. 
31  Or Reichskirchliche Weltganze (empire-church world whole) as it is has also been 
termed. 
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to produce the unitary territorial state. In response to these developments 
Althusius proposed his federalism – the first ever comprehensive federal order. 
The types of associations constituting the encompassing constitutional order 
are private on the one hand and public on the other.32 The first two 
associations, namely the family and the collegia, are private; the rest – the city 
(civitas), the province, up to the empire are public. All of them, however, each 
with its own integrity and jurisdiction, and each playing its own distinctive part 
in the larger constitutional order, are political in that the public associations are 
incapable of arising and enduring in the absence of the sound basis of private 
associations.33 
3.1 The family and collegia 
The family is a natural association based on necessity and affection.34 It should 
not be confused, however, with the modern nuclear family (a couple and their 
children; Afrikaans: gesin) but rather a broader association of kinship that 
includes more distant relatives, allies and friends, sharing similar 
characteristics. But why, one may tend to ask, are families politically 
significant; why are they essential in the constitutional order; and how can it be 
explained that they form part of the constitutional order, yet do not have a 
public nature? The answer to this question reveals a crucial element in 
Althusian constitutionalism. At the same time it marks a fundamental contrast 
with the modern constitutional order which recognises only two entities, 
namely the abstract individual and the sovereign territorial state. It also 
constitutes an answer in anticipation to the totalitarian politics that reared its 
head, first with the thinking of Rousseau and the Jacobins of the French 
Revolution. This totalitarianism culminated in the twentieth century Fascist and 
communist totalitarianism and in the modern-day benign human rights 
totalitarianism35 within the administrative state. Althusius noticed the first signs 
of this totalitarian peril, in terms of which everything, including the family and 
the collegia (broadly referring to commercial and civil society formations, as 
discussed below) is viewed to be public and therefore susceptible to subjection 
to centralised political control. That peril would fully materialise if the families 
and collegia as contemplated above would dissolve and be turned into 
atomised and vulnerable individuals, depending on an over-powerful political 
authority, namely the centralised and homogenising state, devoid of the 
protection and care that families once provided. 
Althusius observed: 
                                            
32  Althusius Politica 27. 
33  Althusius Politica 27. 
34  Althusius Politica 28. 
35  Diamond "Rule of Law" 124. 
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Furthermore, some persons wrongly assert that every symbiotic association is 
public, and none private. Now this axiom stands firm and fixed: all symbiotic 
association and life is essentially, authentically, and generically political. But not 
every symbiotic association is public. There are certain associations that are 
private, such is conjugal and kinship families, and collegia. And these are the 
seedbeds of the public association. Whence it follows that the private association 
is rightly attributed to politics.36 
In Althusius' system families, and not individuals, are the seedbed for the larger 
public associations – the city, province and empire.37 Each family provides 
psychological, social and economic protection to its members allowing a semi-
autonomous (mutual) symbiosis within the family structure. It assigns a basic 
role and place to each of its members and each benefits from the physiological 
and economic protection generated by the collective contribution of all. In this 
way individuals are spared the vulnerable existence of being in a state of 
dependence on a distant and impersonal Leviathan, which has come to 
materialise in the modern state in which individuals have rights only vis a vis 
the state, which, depending on its strength and willingness, might or might not 
be enforced against the state. The family providing this protection enables its 
members to participate as self-reliant citizens in the public affairs of the body-
politic – the city and larger public entities – instead of being the vulnerable 
dependent individual clients delivered to the actions of the centralised state.38 
First, through the specialisation that they engender, collegia contribute towards 
the interests of the members of the collegium in question. This ensures a 
greater benefit for the whole of the body-politic, who benefit from the services 
and the good quality of life that comes with these services. At the same time it 
also enables people to concentrate on matters for which they are talented. 
Secondly, collegia are self-governing entities. They do not owe their existence 
to some concession from a higher authority – they are not the useful tools for 
the exercise of sovereign power – they are self-generated and autonomous.39 
There is no indication that a "higher" body (in contemporary politics, the state) 
may intervene in the affairs of the trade or profession in question and prescribe 
to collegia how such affairs should be administered. Hence, their self-
governance over their own affairs is part of a larger strategy to ensure the 
                                            
36  Althusius Politica 32. 
37  Althusius Politica 31. 
38  It is one of the main themes of Alexis De Tocqueville. De Tocqueville Ancient Regime 
13-14, 24 27 etc, elaborates at length on the real risk that a society consisting only of 
individuals without strong intermediary communities and institutions may be particularly 
prone to absolutism. 
39  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 64, 119. 
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limited government which is the backbone of the very idea of constitutionalism, 
since it fends off authoritarianism and promotes freedom.40 
3.2 The city (civitas) and the province 
In his discussion of the city and provinces, the concurrence of Althusius' 
particular political interests as a city politician of Emden, on the one hand, and 
his broad system of federalist theory, on the other, is at its strongest. He did 
not deal with cities from the distant perspective of an abstract theorist but in 
his capacity as an involved city politician resolute to defend the autonomy of 
Emden. Cities are one of the core elements in Althuius` federal system. He 
paid considerable attention to them and celebrated city life. The city stood at 
the centre of autonomous public life and was the foremost counterweight to 
the territorialism of the province – the germinating territorial state.41 Much of 
his attention he reserved for the celebration of city life.42 Consonant with the 
subsidiarity principle of his federalism, cities should be autonomous, and 
obviously that autonomy was not to be based on some privilege or concession 
from above. It was not to be granted by the provincial or the imperial 
authorities, but on the autonomous rights of the citizen body.43  
Cities are formed when many private associations are linked together. The 
importance of the city, more correctly the polis in Althusius' constitutional 
perspective, harks back to classical Greek politics. This is combined with the 
medieval empire but stands in stark contrast to the dominance of the territorial 
state (with its conglomerate of vulnerable individualised atoms), which has 
come to dominate modernist politics and statist constitutional doctrine. The city 
is the structure that provides the opportunity par excellence for public and 
political life among the symbiotes of the city – of citizens – to flourish to the full. 
The city is a permanent public association. It is not merely a gathering of any 
number individuals, nor a large crowd, mass assemblage or arbitrary throng of 
people. It is a way of symbiotic life of citizens according to the law of that city.44 
Citizens are clearly distinguished from the peregrine, travellers etc (the non-
                                            
40  The importance of guilds resonates later with guild socialism and corporatism, both of 
which are strands in the movement of constitutional pluralism. Also see McRae 1979 
CJPS 684-686. 
41  Althusius did not use the term state or territorial state. The term state was at that stage 
not generally in use. The term "state" in the sense of territorial state was used for the 
first time in 1538 by Thomas Starkey but did not gain general acceptance. Later on it 
was used by Raleigh and Francis Bacon, as well as in the English translation early in 
the seventeenth century of Jean Bodin's work, and finally by Thomas Hobbes. Before 
that time terms such realm, body politic, commonwealth, common weal, civitas and 
republic signifying pre-statist entities were used. In this regard see Skinner "The State" 
120-122. 
42  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 120, 142. 
43  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 44, 120. 
44  Althusius Politica 39. 
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citizens).45 The city includes the suburbs, outposts and villages. Apart from 
being joined together by the law of their city, citizens also share a raft of other 
common denominators – the same language, speech, discipline, customs and 
religion.46 We are dealing here with ideas which prevailed when Western 
Europe was still (Western) Christendom,47 that is, the era before religious 
tolerance was finally recognised,48 when religion was still a res publica on the 
same level as law.49 Citizenship was therefore still as much associated with a 
common religion as it was associated with a common legal order, customs, 
language, etc. In this regard Althusius states that persons who are openly and 
publicly atheists should not be tolerated.50 Neither was unbridled freedom of 
expression recognised. There was no tolerance for the promotion of 
"unnecessary wars" or for those who supported obscenities, that is, "shameful 
acts in public".51 
Of paramount importance – and once again in sharp contrast to modernism's 
atomist individualism, is the fact that the city is a body of many diverse 
associations52 – families and collegia. It is not an arbitrary conglomerate of 
individuals. The city/citizen association must also be highlighted. Coming 
together in the city of families and collegia implied that the members of the 
private associations now assumed a completely new capacity. Now they were 
not spouses, kinsmen and colleagues as they were in their private associations 
but citizens of their city, more specifically not of the state.53 The etymological 
association of citizen with city in a number of languages (Afrikaans: burger with 
burg; German: Burger with Burg; French: citoyen with cite; Spanish: citadinos 
with ciudad) also underscores that the city and not the state or some other 
entity is the primary entity in the constitutional order. 
The discussion of provinces did not appear in the original (1603) edition. 
Provinces as a third tier of consociation were added later in the face of the 
realisation of the growing role and importance of territorial politics.54 The 
                                            
45  Althusius Politica 40; 48. 
46  Althusius Politica 48. Althusius mentions even more common characteristics. 
47  Pennington Seventeenth Century Europe. 
48  This came about in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation and more specifically 
as an outcome of the religious wars in France in the second half of the sixteenth century. 
See Malan Politocracy 74. 
49  For example, as in the peace treaty of Augsburg of 1555, in terms of which the religious 
character of a principality was determined by its prince (cuius regio, eius religio), which 
determination provided for the ius emmigrandi of the subjects who did not identify with 
the chosen religion. 
50  Althusius Politica 77. 
51  Althusius Politica 77. 
52  Althusius Politica 40. 
53  Althusius Politica 40. This distinction corresponds with that of Aristotle in Politeia Book 
III, ch 4, 107 as well as Book III, ch 13, 129. Also see the views expressed by Malan on 
citizenship in Politocracy 299-302. 
54  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 123. 
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provinces could be either secular or ecclesiastical,55 that is, an element of the 
ecclesiastical or the secular constitution. In line with this, Althusius explains 
that secular political authority does not vest supremely in a single centre. 
Provinces, like cities, which share divided political authority, contribute to this 
limitation and therefore to constitutionalism. Althusius explains the relationship 
between provincial authorities and the imperial authorities (discussed in 2.6.3 
below) as follows: 
Even though these heads, prefects and rectors of provinces recognise the 
supreme magistrate of the realm as their superior, from whom their administration 
and power are conceded, nevertheless they have rights of sovereignty in their 
territory, and stand in the place of the supreme prince. They prevail as much in 
their territory as does the emperor or the supreme magistrate in the realm, except 
for superior pre-eminence, and certain other specifically reserved to the supreme 
magistrate who does the constituting.56 
3.3 The realm or universal commonwealth / association 
The universal association encompassing all the associations thus far 
discussed is a polity in the fullest sense of the word. This association is the 
imperium, realm or commonwealth (Althusius is not that much concerned 
about the exact form of the authority or with the particular person or persons - 
a single monarchical king or a number of polyarchical symbiotes in whom 
authority vests).57 The commonwealth exists on both the ecclesiastical as well 
as the secular level, but the general principles of the commonwealth obtain to 
both. The commonwealth is constituted from below, by common agreement of 
many symbiotic associations and particular bodies.58 Thus, cities and 
provinces oblige themselves to hold, organise, use and defend, through their 
common efforts, the legal order of the commonwealth.59 
The members of the commonwealth therefore are the cities and provinces 
(Althusius adds regions here) who have agreed to constitute the 
commonwealth, not individuals. Members "(I) say, are not individual men, 
families or collegia as in a private or particular public association".60 The realm 
is based on consensus and trust, that is, on a tacit and express promise of 
economic co-operation and counsel under a shared legal order.61 
                                            
55  Carney "Translators Introduction" xx. 
56  Althusius Politica 62. 
57  Althusius Politica 66. 
58  Althusius Politica 66. 
59  Althusius Politica 66. Quite clearly the principle of subsidiarity is once again prominent 
in this context. 
60  Althusius Politica 67. Just as in the case of cities, Althusius makes specific reference to 
the exclusion of aliens. 
61  Althusius Politica 67. 
K MALAN  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  14 
From the outset Althusius takes pains to explain that the authority of the 
commonwealth is limited, that is, constitutional. Although the authority of the 
commonwealth is referred to as the supreme authority, such sovereignty is 
clearly not to be equated with sovereignty in the modern, unbound sense of 
the word. "(O)wnership" of the realm does not belong to the supreme authority 
but to the encompassing community; the supreme authority has the authority 
only to administer.62 Althusius, basing his view on Roman law authority and on 
St Augustine, insists that the supreme authority is under the law (and under 
religious precepts). If not, the supreme authority is no true authority, more 
specifically in this case, the king is not a true king, but a tyrant. This view 
underscores Althusius' subscription to the idea of constitutional government.  
The government of the commonwealth is government for the whole; that is, for 
all the parts of which it is comprised and not only for a particular section.63 The 
very idea of public office, analysed in a discussion of the foundational tenets 
of Althusius' constitutionalism,64 relates to government for the whole and not 
only for a specific part. The ephors (discussed in 4 below) are a crucial 
mechanism to secure that government, which has to be in accordance with the 
law and customs of the commonwealth (including the cities and provinces), is 
in fact operating for the general public good. 
In dealing with the commonwealth Althusius, in line with a long-standing 
tradition in classical and medieval political thought,65 underscores the 
importance of size or extent. This is crucial for the well-being of the 
commonwealth since its being either too small or too large may undermine the 
commonwealth.66 A commonwealth with a large population is beneficial to fend 
off external forces and contribute towards its prosperity. On the other hand, 
however, an overpopulated region or commonwealth can never be free from 
disadvantages, of which the most important ones could result from a loss of 
public virtue in a community where wealth is preferred to virtue, bribes to 
justice, timidity to courage, and evil to good. Too large a population might 
further lead to over-confidence, folly, contempt and the weakening of the 
commonwealth. It might also generate an undesirable concentration of power 
with potentially dangerous consequences for the commonwealth. Power, says 
Althusius, leads to wealth, to the pursuit of sensual pleasures, and to 
corruption. "When the might of a commonwealth grows, fortitude and virtue 
decline."67 Having regard to all these considerations, Althusius concludes that 
                                            
62  Althusius Politica 66. The distinction that Althusius makes here is in fact an old one 
recognised right through medieval thought. 
63  Althusius Politica 73. 
64  Malan 2017 PELJ 24 – 26 (2.4) 
65  Aristotle The Politics Book VII ch 4 had already dealt withthis issue. 
66  Althusius Politica 68. 
67  Althusius Politica 68. 
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a commonwealth of medium size would be the best and steadiest.68 He does 
not elaborate on the ideal size of a commonwealth either in terms of the 
number of citizens or in terms of geographical area.69 
3.4 The ecclesiastical side of the constitutional order 
Althusius' community of piety is also of significance to the "worldly" 
constitution. He therefore deals at some length with the internal arrangements 
of the church organisation, which is in part also based on his general federal 
scheme. I do not deal with these internal arrangements in this discussion. More 
pertinent for the present discussion is the fact that the office bearers of the 
church play a part in the worldly constitution in that they serve as an additional 
check on the exercise of worldly political power, which had to be exercised 
within the confines of broad religious tenets. In this sense, church office 
bearers play a role similar to that of the ephors. 
This constitutional role of the church dates back to the medieval constitutional 
practice that originated from the papal revolution of the late eleventh century, 
in the course of which the secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions were clearly 
distinguished and defined. The office-bearers of each were accordingly limited 
to their respective jurisdictions. This provided for limited government within 
each jurisdiction and is therefore nothing less than a constitutional measure of 
the first order. Moreover, the church served as a check on secular government, 
which had to act within the broad confines of justice and piety, thus further 
bolstering these constitutional arrangements.70 
Althusius' thinking is rooted in this tradition. It does not limit constitutional 
arrangements to the confines of the structures within the power apparatus of 
the (centralised) territorial state. His constitutionalism involves a variety of 
power structures in terms of his comprehensive federal order, including the 
church. 
3.5 The supreme magistrate 
The supreme magistrate is the head of the universal commonwealth, as 
discussed in 2.5.4. Althusius' discussion of this matter must be seen against 
the background of the medieval empire, which was headed by the emperor as 
the supreme magistrate. The adjective "supreme" might give the impression 
                                            
68  Althusius Politica 69. 
69  In the present world with a population of more than 7 billion people the achievement of 
a commonwealth of medium size clearly calls for a new interpretation of the idea of 
"medium size". Large megacities may be too big to qualify as cities of medium size, 
unless very innovative constitutional mechanisms are introduced. However, a large 
number of (non-mega) cities autonomously organised may square with a contemporary 
interpretation of Althusius' notion of medium size. 
70  Althusius Politica 59. 
K MALAN  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  16 
that the (supreme) magistrate – either the single person of the emperor or a 
collection of persons occupying such an office – possessed unconstrained 
political power. This impression is understandable, especially if it is based on 
a modern understanding of supremacy and sovereignty with a possible 
connotation of unbridled power. It would be entirely wrong, however, to ascribe 
to Althusius the view that absolute power should be assigned to the supreme 
magistrate. Absolutism, that is, legally unconstrained political power, was 
completely alien to the medieval constitutionalism from which Althusius drew 
inspiration.71 The core concepts of Althusian constitutionalism as discussed 
here, namely the sovereignty of law, popular sovereignty, the covenant, the 
ephors, and most importantly, the comprehensive federal scheme are all 
ramparts against unconstrained rule and tend towards constitutional 
government. They are principles and structures of limited government and for 
the diffusion, control and balance of power. They represent the direct opposite 
of absolutism. The classical distinction between the (true) king and the tyrant, 
to which Althusius subscribed (already referred to above) also reinforced this 
aversion to absolutism. Moreover, Althusius took aim precisely against those 
thinkers of his time, namely William Barclay and Jean Bodin, who advocated 
more absolutist forms of government.72 By virtue of his subscribing to popular 
sovereignty and sovereignty of the law, Althusius emphasises consistently that 
office-bearers in authority within all the structures of his federal scheme are 
bound to act under the authority of the commonwealth and the law. 
The advice that Althusius gives to public office-bearers, including the supreme 
magistrate, on how best to govern, provides further support to his balanced 
constitution, which provides for a variety of power centres within his federal 
order. Having stated that office-bearers should be treated with respect, 
Althusius continues as follows: 
In his administration of justice the magistrate should always and regularly observe 
that moderation is exercised, and that the right of each member of the 
commonwealth is conserved, neither diminished nor increased to the detriment 
of another. The imperium of the king ought never to be so enlarged that the liberty 
of the people be suppressed.73 
In various other passages Althusius explains that public office-bearers should 
govern with practical wisdom. As a matter of general principle government 
should always act in the best interest of the general public good. This, after all, 
is the hallmark of genuine public office. Public office-bearing should be marked 
by temperance and due consideration of all relevant factors pertaining to 
matters that are up for decision. The conduct of public office-bearers should 
                                            
71  See Malan 2015 THRHR 254-259 especially the discussion on sovereignty of the law. 
72  See Althusius Politica 71, 72, 105, 130, and 149, 171-174 against Bodin and 109-111, 
201 against Barclay. 
73  Althusius Politica 175. 
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display a sense of conservatism. They should take heed of how present 
problems have been dealt with in the past. In the beginning of chapter 21, titled 
"Political prudence in the administration of the commonwealth", Althusius 
refers with approval to the statement by Seneca and to biblical sources and 
then concludes that office-bearers have to act in a way that has stood the test 
of time. He refers to Gregorius' De Republica, which states that the good 
governor will, before making his own decision, consider past events in his own 
and in other commonwealths to see what was done well and what was done 
badly. In contrast, bad government is government that fails to take heed of 
previous experience. Althusius quotes Gregorius as follows: 
Most miserable is that commonwealth therefore, in which its governor is 
imprudent or ignorant in the art of governing, in which he learns for the first ime 
from his own experience those things that were necessary from the beginning.74 
Referring to various biblical texts Althusius asserts that God requires for the 
administration of the commonwealth those who excel in the practice and 
experience of things.75 The good governor must have an understanding of 
doctrine (doctrina), which basically means knowledge and practice (usus).76 
Knowledge comes from reading and listening. Reading enables one to learn 
from the voice of the dead, "(o)r from silent instructors … principally by the 
reading of histories".77 However, Althusius clearly prefers governors who 
consult and listen with an open mind as a better way of learning.78 
4 The public office of the ephors 
Linguistically the term and the office of the ephors are of Greek origin.79 In 
medieval political thought there are repeated references attesting to the 
importance of the ephors.80 As will be shown in this section, the terms "ephors" 
refers to a council which assists the supreme magistrate to execute his 
responsibilities in accordance with the law and the covenant between the 
commonwealth and the magistrate, and ensures that the authority is exercised 
to the benefit of the commonwealth. The ephors also serve as a 
counterbalance of authority and power against the sovereign. In consequence 
the prevention of any abuse of power to the detriment of any particular 
community or the commonwealth in general is ensured, and the degeneration 
of government into tyranny which is harmful to the commonwealth or to any 
particular community is prevented. Furthermore, government to the sectional 
gain of only one faction of the commonwealth or to the individual gain of the 
                                            
74  Althusius Politica 136. 
75  Althusius Politica 137. 
76  Althusius Politica 137. 
77  Althusius Politica 138. 
78  Althusius Politica 138. 
79  Aristotle refers to the ephors on 71, 87-88 and 103 in his Politea (The Politics). 
80  See for example Carlyle History of Medieval Political Theory 406-440. 
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supreme magistrate himself81 is also prevented. This responsibility of the 
ephors highlights their constitutional significance, because constitutionalism 
can be sustained only when power is contained by counter-power in a system 
of checks and balances which is an essential part of the notion of 
constitutionalism, as is outlined at the beginning of this article. 
Ephors are representatives of the commonwealth or of communities within the 
compound commonwealth. Ephors can go by many possible designations 
depending, among other things, on the constitutional order concerned. They 
may be referred to as patricians, elders, princes, estates, first citizens or 
counsellors of the realm, protectors of the covenant, custodians and defenders 
of the law, justices of the commonwealth, censors of royal honour, brothers of 
the supreme magistrate, and optimates.82 Althusius sets out the powers and 
responsibilities of the ephors in chapters 18 and 38 of the Politica. In terms of 
those two chapters the following powers and responsibilities can be extracted: 
- They act in the best interest of the commonwealth. 
- They constitute the supreme magistrate (general administrator). 
- They promote sound governance by articulating the widest variety of 
views to the benefit of the whole and with due regard to the principle of 
popular sovereignty. 
- They assist and counsel the supreme magistrate. 
- They act as a counterbalance to the supreme magistrate by restraining, 
containing, impeding and correcting the magistrate, and keeping him 
accountable, and in so doing act as guarantors of constitutional 
government and as a bulwark against tyranny. 
- They act as the custodians, defenders and vindicators of the liberties and 
rights within the commonwealth. 
- (Temporarily) they may act as an interregnum. 
- When the supreme magistrate disregards the law and the covenant and 
descends into tyranny, they resist him and, if required, they legitimately 
remove him from office.83 
                                            
81  An inquiry into the nature of the responsibilities of the ephors shows that their 
responsibilities are of a judicial nature – Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 149. 
82  Althusius Politica 100, 104. 
83  Althusius Politica 91, 99, 103-115, 194-200. 
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- There may also be ephors who safeguard the interests of specific 
communities that is of minorities within the compound commonwealth.84 
Elaborating on the power and responsibility of containing and restraining the 
supreme magistrate, it is important to underscore that Althusian 
constitutionalism, like any fully-fledged cogent constitutionalism, is not only a 
matter of laudable principles and values discussed above. Neither is it only a 
question of individual (and communal) rights. In the final analysis, it is also a 
matter of power, or more specifically, the balance of power. The effective 
balance of power is required to prevent tyranny, to guarantee government 
under the law, and to maintain rights. This is the very reason why the ephors 
are so important. They are entitled to be an effective mechanism of 
constitutionalism not only because they are obliged to do the right thing but 
because they command sufficient authority to do so. Althusius expresses this 
idea as follows: 
For great power can not contain itself within boundaries without some coercion 
and constraint entrusted to others.85 
The potency of the ephors in the constitutional order is such that without their 
approval no "enactment or general decree" of the supreme magistrate would 
be valid. If the counsel of the ephors cannot prevent or mitigate unjust decrees 
that violate the integrity of the commonwealth or part of it, it is their duty to 
oppose and impede these decrees.86 Althusius expressly rejects the absolutist 
views of Jean Bodin87 as well as those of William Barclay. Alhusius went out 
of his way to counter Barclay's views.88 By exercising their powers in this way 
the ephors act as a rampart against tyranny and as the keeper of legal and 
popular sovereignty, because in the final analysis, as the discussion of 
sovereignty above has shown, political sovereignty vests in the commonwealth 
and not in the supreme magistrate, a view which Althusius was once again at 
pains to repeat.89 The commonwealth entrusts to the ephors the power to care 
and defend the commonwealth "(a)gainst all violators, disturbers and 
plunderers, even against the supreme magistrate himself".90 Althusius' views 
in this regard were clearly formed against the backdrop of his own times, during 
                                            
84  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 184, 190. 
85  Althusius Politica 104. Carney "Translators Introduction" 21 quite aptly highlights this 
crucial constitutional truth. 
86  Althusius Politica 104. 
87  Althusius Politica 105. Also see Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 76. For a discussion of 
the views of Bodin, see Malan Politiocracy 67-75. 
88  Althusius Politica 109-115. William Barclay was a proponent of the theory of the divine 
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were published in 1600. See Sabine History of Political Theory 393. 
89  Althusius Politica 106, 119. 
90  Althusius Politica 106. 
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which the Habsburg king of Spain (amongst others) was viewed as the violator 
of the Dutch (part of the) commonwealth.91 
Ensuing from their power to protect the commonwealth against tyranny, the 
ephors have the power to resist a supreme magistrate with tyrannical 
tendencies, that is, a magistrate breaching the law and his covenant with the 
commonwealth, acting against the general interest and caring only for himself 
or one section of the commonwealth to the detriment of the rest. In such a case 
the ephors are duty-bound to act against tyrannical rule. The ephors may do 
so only in the event of patent misconduct, because as Althusius states in line 
with the long natural law tradition in medieval political thought, resistance to 
government is legitimate only when the rulers' actions are repugnant to natural 
law.92 There is therefore no licence for unlawlessness. If governmental conduct 
is no longer compatible with natural law, it is the duty of the ephors, to depose 
the ruler concerned. When deposed, the leader is cast out, which, according 
to Athusius, may in given circumstances entail the death of the tyrant.93 The 
duty of resistance and deposition is the duty of the ephors acting collectively.94 
It does not fall within the right of the populace to do so of their own accord. 
Who then are the ephors? Where do they come from and how are they 
constituted? In one sense they have always been there as a given of the 
classical and medieval constitutional tradition. A more detailed answer would 
be that the ephors, being the defenders of the commonwealth, are constituted 
by the commonwealth. They are, as Althusius says, elected and constituted by 
the consent of the commonwealth95 or of each relevant community (city or 
province). They are an incidence of the federal constitutional order, within 
which political authority is diffused to vest simultaneously in a multitude of 
centres of power. Ehpors are there by the consent of the tribes, by centurial or 
curial division (the constitutional structure of the classical polis) and by the 
votes of the entire people collated through centuries, tribes or collegia in which 
the people are distributed. However, what is to happen if there are no ephors 
or if the ephors forsake their responsibilities? This brings us to an entirely 
different dimension of Althusius' constitutional system, discussed mainly in 
chapter 38 under the heading, "Tyranny and its remedies". The point of 
departure is that lax and defaulting ephors or the absence of ephors do not 
leave the commonwealth without resort, at least not from the point of view of 
legal and constitutional principle, because sovereignty, in the final analysis, 
remains vested in the commonwealth, which serves as the residual source 
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within the constitutional order.96 When there are no ephors to act against 
tyrannical government, or where the existing ephors desert their duties, there 
should be special ephors discharging the ephorical constitutional 
responsibility. 
When the ephors do not diligently execute these responsibilities, they are to 
be held liable and, as Althusius states, may rightly be viewed as betrayers of 
the commonwealth, "(e)specially when they secretly conspire or connive in the 
wicked and impious actions of the king".97 More specifically, when there are no 
ephors, or if they forsake their responsibilities, the commonwealth or the part 
within the commonwealth which is left without the protection of the ephors, 
must elect their own ephors. Then the commonwealth or the affected 
community of the commonwealth must constitute for themselves ad hoc "public 
defenders".98 
Althusius has in mind specifically a situation where part of the commonwealth 
is harmed by tyranny. (Evidently the suggestion was that the Dutch provinces 
were being harmed by the actions of the tyrannical Spanish king). He states: 
These special ephors are obliged to defend only that part of the realm whose care 
and safety has been entrusted to them but they certainly ought not to abandon 
the subjects and the region over which they preside unless they first have 
attempted all legitimate course of action, and have given them up as hopeless…99  
Although Althusius is adamant that the populace may not act on their own and 
that individual ephors are generally also not entitled to act on their own, a 
section of ephors emanating from a part of (a distinctive community within) the 
commonwealth which is injured by tyrannical conduct that cannot pass the test 
of natural law has the duty to do so, and therefore to lead that part of the 
commonwealth to what today would be called secession. Thus, Althusius 
declares: 
…one of the ephors may not take imperium away from the magistrate, declare 
him to be a private person, kill him, resist him beyond the boundaries of this 
ephor's own territory or of the region assigned to this ephor, or prosecute 
him…However, it shall be permitted one part of the ream, or individual ephors or 
estates of the realm, to withdraw from subjection to the tyranny of their magistrate 
and to defend themselves.100 
A few pages on, Althusius, referring to leading legal publicists as authority 
elaborated on the question of the right to secession by part of the 
commonwealth which is faced with tyranny, and then declares: 
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One of the estates or one part of the realm, can abandon the remaining body to 
which it belonged and choose for itself a separate ruler or a new form of 
commonwealth when the public and manifest welfare of this entire part altogether 
requires it, or where fundamental laws of the country are not observed by the 
magistrate but are obstinately and outrageously violated, or when the true 
worship and the disclosed command of God clearly require and demand that this 
be done. And this part of the realm can defend by force of arms its new form and 
status against the other parts of the realm from which it withdrew… Thus also 
subjects can withdraw their support from a magistrate who does not defend them 
when he should, and can justly recourse to another prince and submit themselves 
to him. Or if a magistrate refuses to administer justice, they can resist him and 
refuse to pay taxes..101 
Casey observes insightfully that the quoted stance on secession is premised 
on Althusius' view of the composition of the political order as an entity 
consisting of bodies (not individuals). The bodies may break away from the 
larger body in the event of any breach of the covenant or any harmful or 
unlawful treatment by government. Individuals cannot secede but bodies 
can.102 This observation brings to light that the notion of the (right to) secession 
is related to the fundamental conception of the state. The atomist state, that is, 
the typical Hobbesian state, which is perceived to be a conglomeration of 
individual atoms, cannot conceive of the idea of secession. In contrast, the 
composite constitutional order, which is construed on the basis of building 
blocks of communities, can and does accommodate the notion of secession 
when one or more building blocks break away. 
The office of special ephors for a specific community in the commonwealth 
which suffers from tyranny (and which is entitled to secede) relates to the 
accommodation minorities. What is clear is that Althusius' federalism is an 
important corrective to the majority principle on the basis of individual 
liberalism, because it acknowledges that the liberty and autonomy of particular 
communities deserve specific protection and that their interests should not be 
overridden by the majority.103 This would include the protection of cities within 
the larger federal commonwealth.104 
This then concludes the discussion of Althusius' constitutionalism as outlined 
in the Politica, a constitutionalism which in the final analysis amounts to a 
comprehensive apology for the balanced and mixed constitution105 embodied 
in an encompassing system of republican federalism based on a 
communitarian view of human life and politics and a keen recognition of all 
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communities within the broad constitutional order that assigns power and 
authority to the office-bearers of all such communities. 
5 Analysis and conclusion 
Althusius' constitutionalism represents particularity and universality; it 
maintains a balance of autonomy based on subsidiarity and solidarity. 
Althusius was strongly influenced by Aristotle but his own particular historic 
circumstances rendered any comprehensive transplantation of Aristotle's 
views impossible. The Greek philosophers did not go beyond the 
homogeneous close-knit unitarian polis.106 Neither did Althusius opt for the 
opposite extreme of medieval and early modern views when the European 
world "(w)as characterized by a plural maze of interconnected larger and 
smaller political orders and some, like St. Augustine or Dante, would only see 
the universal perspective of an empire".107 Althusius, however, also opposed 
Jean Bodin and the successor statist thinkers who accepted the final demise 
of Christian universality (and a universal empire) and who embraced the idea 
of the absolute sovereignty of individual territorial states (populated by abstract 
individual citizens). Althusius, quite differently, as Hueglin puts it: 
(t)ried to conceptualize the complex real world of whole and part, universal and 
particular order, as a many-layered problem requiring a multilevel constitutional 
solution. On the one hand he could not ignore Bodin's epochal definition of 
sovereignty any more, since it had already begun to reorganize the modern world 
of territorial centralization. On the other hand, his entire own social background 
and theoretical as well as practical motivation did not allow him to abandon the 
defence of the particular order against the absolute territorial state. He somehow 
had to find a reconciling compromise between the new principle of territorial 
sovereignty and the autonomous aspirations of socio-economic, cultural-
religious, and territorial minorities. By grafting the principle of sovereignty upon 
the organized body of the people rather than a state somehow representing 
individual citizens, he may indeed deserve to be regarded as one of the first early 
modern theorists of popular sovereignty. By conceptualizing that organized body 
of the people as a plural and ascending order of power-sharing and co-operation, 
he very definitely must appear as a theorist of federalism. 
The entire political theory of Althusius is characterized by a dialectical relationship 
of unity and plurality, consociation consociationum. From jurisprudence and 
theology he borrows the general premise that social life cannot exist without 
government, and that government (but by no means all forms of social life!) 
cannot exist without subordination under some ultimate authority. In the same 
breath he affirms that the generality of this premise must be concretized by a 
plurality of constitutional arrangements, 'according to the nature and necessity of 
each consociation'. This is not a juridical differentiation of general norms and 
particular legal order. Rather, it is something like a constitutional blending of the 
                                            
106  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 114. For the same reason he could also not follow like 
theorists such as Marsilius or Machiavelli, because they, as Hueglin Early Modern 
Concepts 114 puts it, focussed almost exclusively on the existential woes of small city 
republics; or ssuch as Thomas, who envisioned a world of insular homogeneity. 
107  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 114. 
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Greek ideal of the small autonomous polis, and the Roman concept of universal 
empire… 
Althusius now takes from Aristotle the idea of the polity as the basic constitutional 
form of political life and aggregates it into the plurality of a compound realm. In 
doing so, he insists that attributing a definite end to each particular type of 
assemblage does not mean that there cannot be a common end for all.108 
The way in which Althusius responded to the challenges of modernization and 
territorialism was to balance the early modern rise of the territorial state with 
what he regarded as the need for universal regulation and the continuing 
tradition of social life in local-regional structures of productive autonomy. In 
doing so, as Hueglin explained, he sought to preserve the particular identities 
of regional structures with a new universality of intensified interdependence 
and efficiency. The product was the first modern theory of federalism.109 
With the benefit of hindsight there were already strong indications that at the 
time of the publication of the Politica and notwithstanding all his efforts, 
Althusius' ideas would soon be overtaken by statism. The advent of the 
territorial state and the establishment and entrenchment of the paradigm of 
statism in political and constitutional thought110 left no space for Althusius' 
republican federalism. In recent decades, however, the territorial state has 
been weakened by potent forces from above and below: from above, mainly 
by the forces of economic globalisation and universal standards of proper 
governance; and from below, amongst others, by the forces of cultural, 
religious and ethnic communities who  reject the idea of their own liquidation 
in order to be remade in the image of the statist Leviathan, and claim instead 
to be constitutionally accommodated in a way that recognises their distinctive 
identities and claims to democratic self-governance within a pluralist (post-
statist and cosmopolitan) constitutional order.111 In step with that, the sway of 
the statist paradigm has also yielded as crucial concepts of politics and 
constitutional law are increasingly reconceived in a non-statist and post-statist 
way. This post-statist mode of thinking can arguably be described as 
politocratic, a term that suggests, amongst other things, that: 
- power should be vested in a multitude of centres and not only in the 
government of the centralised territorial state; and  
- that citizenship which in the massocratic megalopolis112 (the large 
territorial state) has shrunk to barely more than a formal legal status, 
could be reinvigorated so as to denote actual participation in self-
                                            
108  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 114-115. 
109  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 132-133. 
110  On this topic in general see Malan Politocracy ch 3, 4 and 6. 
111  See for example Cable 1995 Daedalus 23, Strange 1995 Daedalus 56. 
112  To use the apt terms of Sartori Democratic Theory 21. 
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government, which to my mind is achievable only within a politocratic 
political order.113 
It is against this backdrop that Althusius' views are now regaining the ground 
they lost centuries ago and are growing in importance in present-day political 
and constitutional theory. Just as it was not possible for Althusius simply to 
apply Aristotle's views in the circumstances of his time, it is also impossible for 
us to apply Althusius' views in present-day conditions. Past theories, as  
Hueglin aptly stated: "(d)o not provide ready blueprints for the explanation of 
the present world, nor for alternative constructions".114 Past theories can, 
however, be instructive "(a)s a reservoirs of ideas allowing for a comparative 
exploration of similar and analogous positions of theory and practice across 
time."115 In this way the past is not a closed, inaccessible book which is 
completely locked away from us. It is our inheritance, the body of our 
experience, the living tradition of our collective memory, that can inform us and 
from which we can benefit and upon which we can build".116 
The Politica relays Althusius' interpretation and defence of the late medieval 
political order of Western Christianity – Western Europe. No doubt the 
interpretation is somewhat idealistic, as Althusius does not concede any 
shortcomings in the system. That is why it is regarded as an interpretation and 
not merely a description. Althusius gives an account of a constitutional 
dispensation, in part based on historical experience and firmly supported by 
"sacred and profane" biblical, theological and philosophical examples and 
juridical authority, which he presents as the ideal constitutional order.  
There are many crucial present-day issues that Althusius did not deal with, 
issues that gain importance only in times after Althusius. Most importantly, 
individual rights, which are enjoying centre stage in present-day constitutional 
thinking and practice, did not feature in Althusian thinking, at least not under 
the present-day designations of constitutional, fundamental, basic or human 
                                            
113  By this is meant a politico-constitutional order of multispherical government by the 
citizens of every political community over the specific res publica — the commonwealth 
— of the relevant community, as discussed in ch 10; more specifically at 299 et seq of 
Malan Politocracy. The views on citizenship that I advocated there correspond with 
those of Althusius, summarised as follows by Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 234: "By 
organising active citizenship in an ascending order of cumulative consociation held 
together by fundamental laws established and shared on the basis of consent and 
solidarity, the Althusian commonwealth foreshadows a cosmopolitan construction of 
politics in which 'People would come …to enjoy multiple citizenships – political 
membership in the diverse political communities which significantly affected them. They 
would be citizens of their immediate communities, and of the wider regional and global 
networks which impact upon their lives'". 
114  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 269. 
115  Hueglin Early Modern Concepts 198. 
116  This is how Edmund Reflections viewed the past. His entire work speaks of this 
approach but see specifically 117, 192, 196, 267, 282 and 305.  
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rights.117 At present it is impossible to conceive of any constitutional 
dispensation in which these rights are not prominently accounted for. The 
absence of this theme in Althusian constitutionalism is one of several reasons 
why it is impossible to simply transplant Althusian thinking into our present-day 
world. 
There is another reason why Althusian thinking does not lend itself to such 
transplantation, which is that in pre-modern natural-law thinking, to which 
Althusius still mainly subscribes, society is viewed as essentially a fixed order, 
that is, a naturally and divinely ordained order which is not susceptible to 
fundamental change. The tumultuous social and political historical events that 
have since occurred over many centuries belie any belief in the natural 
permanence of socio-political realities. Political and constitutional thinking 
proceeding strictly from the static premise inherent in such belief has forfeited 
credibility and lost the appeal it once had. 
Statism, however, is also not a natural and unchangeable given. In the face of 
the descent of statism it is informative and therefore relevant to consider past 
thinking, which, if freely (instead of fundamentally) interpreted and judiciously 
utilised, may prove to give valuable pointers to the future. It is in this context 
that Althusius enters the present-day stage. 
I highlight only the two aspects of Althusian constitutionalism which are 
arguably most important for constitutional thinking in the present and a future 
age. The first is an anthroplogical aspect and the second relates to state 
departmentalisation. 
5.1 An anthropological odservation 
In the first part of this discussion it was pointed out that statist constitutionalism 
recognises only two entities, namely the state and the individual, and that 
statist constitutionalism provided a framework for centralisation and, more 
importantly, for homogenization, in that everybody within the territorial state is 
to be remade in the image of the statist Leviathan, which in practical terms 
means in the image of the dominant community in the population of the state 
concerned. On close analysis, statist constitutionalism is premised on an 
abstract anthropology that views human beings in extremely generalised 
terms. All people are viewed as being basically the same. The differences 
between them are so negligible that they can be ignored in political and 
constitutional theory and can be disregarded when devising a constitution. 
                                            
117  Designations such as constitutional, fundamental, basic or human rights. Basic 
freedoms were in a process of being acknowledged, as in  the interdictum de homine 
liberum exhibendum and the writ of habeas corpus. Fully-fledged sets of basic rights 
came to be recognised only in the French and American Revolutions and then finally 
after World War II. 
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Since there are no notable differences between them, people are not to view 
themselves from a community perspective. Humankind is not seen as a 
collection of communities, nor as individuals belonging to a collection of 
communities, but simply as an aggregate of (abstract) individuals. In this 
regard Locke considers the state to be an aggregate of persons or, as he puts 
it, any number of men, and not the politico-constitutional apparatus of one or 
more communities.118 It is also on that score that modernist social contract 
theories, which are as distant from one another as the theories of Hobbes and 
John Rawls, can be seen to be based on the same premise of the universalised 
abstract individual.119 
Implicit in Althusius' thinking is a totally different anthropology. Although there 
might be general proclivities (such as the human urge for creating and 
maintaining community life), humankind is not made up of abstract individuals 
who are fundamentally the same as all other abstract individuals. Human 
beings are specified particularly in the sense that they belong to and that their 
identities, outlook and way of life are shaped by communities – cultural, 
linguistic, religious, local and others. There is an inherent value in all these 
communities. All are worthy of recognition and protection because they are 
valuable to the people who belong to them. It is of even greater importance to 
understand that all communities together, each with its distinctive 
characteristics, makes its own unique contribution towards constituting the 
totality of mankind, that is, to universal humanity.120 If any one of these 
communities is destroyed or assimilated with another, or prevented from being 
part of universal humanity, two things occur simultaneously. Firstly, a mischief, 
even a crime, against the community concerned is committed. Secondly, it is 
a wrong perpetrated against the totality of humankind. Precisely for that reason 
it is apt to view genocide as a crime against humanity. We therefore have what 
we may call a germinating law of inter-communal relations,121 which prohibits 
not only genocide but arguably also hate speech. In consequence, the integrity 
of the community is protected and not in the first place that of individual 
members of the community. 
                                            
118  It is also as a result of this that Friedrich Man and his Government 547 quite aptly made 
the observation that the building of the modern state preceded the building of the nation 
(the statist nation, of course). 
119  It is also to be noted that Rawls also shared with Hobbes the same statist premise. See 
the discussion in Malan Politicracy 155-163. 
120  The insights of the late eighteenth century German philosopher, Johann Gottlfried 
Herder are particularly instructive in this context. Herder's view of the universal humanity 
constituted by the indispensable contribution of each cultural community made him a 
staunch opponent of colonialism since that was an assault on the variety of communities 
and an impoverishment of the universal Humanität. See the discussion of Barnard 
Herder's Social and Political Thought 97 et seq. 
121  On this issue, see the discussion in Malan 2014 De Jure 231-257. 
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Due to its abstract anthropology, statism lacks a sense of a community-based 
universal humanity. It is preoccupied with abstract individuals – any number of 
men – within the (abstract) space of the territorial state, which during the 
nineteenth and more specifically the twentieth century led to the destruction of 
many cultural communities within (erstwhile) multicultural territorial states. 
Frightened by this destruction, the past decades have seen the emergence of 
minority rights. That is a favourable development far from an adequate guard 
against the destructive logic of statism. It is inadequate because the rights 
(reluctantly, from a statist perspective) afforded to communities (or rather, to 
individual members of communities122) are adjudicated by statist judiciaries. It 
does not vest communities with the powers of autonomous government. The 
rights of minorities therefore remain within the paradigm of statism. What is 
therefore required is that communities should also be vested with powers of 
self-governance, thus doing away with undivided state sovereignty and the 
vitriolic consequences of statist homogenisation. This implies a macro-federal 
constitutional order in which the totality of particular communities as well as 
universal humanity enjoy recognition. This is an order that might be described 
as politocratic. It denotes the dispensation of multispherical government by the 
citizens of every political community, from the smallest habitative community 
to the largest universal community, by the relevant citizens of each community 
over the specific common goods (res publica/commonwealth) of each 
community.123 Althusius' federalism, based on his concrete communitarian 
outlook, in contrast to a generalised abstract anthropology as outlined in his 
Politica, provided the framework for such post statist politicratic 
constitutionalism. 
5.2 State-departmentalisation 
Present-day (statist) constitutionalism is essentially state-departmentalised. 
The structures that it provides for the checking and controlling of power and 
for guarding against power abuse are all structures o, and within the same 
power apparatus of the state in question. The doctrine of the separation of 
powers with its "independent and impartial" judiciary augmented by a raft of 
other so-called independent and impartial constitutional bodies such as public 
protectors, ombuds, independent and impartial judicial service commissions, 
auditors general, prosecutorial authorities and a panoply of other seemingly 
independent and impartial constitutional bodies, are all integral elements of 
one and the same state structure and in the final analysis constituted and 
                                            
122  The wording of article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) demonstrates this point. Rights under this provision accrue to the members of 
minorities, not the communities as such. Lately, however, the provision has been 
generously interpreted so as to expand protection also to communities. 
123  Malan Politocracy 272. The concept of habitative communities, the smallest local and 
cultural communities, is explained in Politocracy xi and ch 10. 
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conditioned by a single power elite under the control of a single centralised 
centre of political power. Regardless of their formal separation and their formal 
independence and impartiality, these powers, institutions and bodies are in the 
final analysis tied together in a single power structure under the control of the 
leading force within such a state.  They therefore assume the character of state 
departments under the direct control of the dominant political power in the 
legislature and the executive. It is precisely for this reason that I posit that our 
dominant constitutional thinking and practice essentially provide for state-
departmentalisation. 
In substantive terms such state-departmentalisation falls far short of providing 
for the real separation of powers and checks and balances. Instead it 
establishes a unitary power system. By the same token, these institutions are 
dependent on the leading political forces in the legislature and the executive 
and are biased in their favour, in spite of the formal appearance of 
independence and impartiality.124 Appointments to these institutions are 
determined by a single power centre which is dominant in the legislature and 
the executive (and emanates from the ruling political party.) Whilst this state of 
affairs is kept in check in a system where there are regular changes in 
government, state-departmentalisation is acutely harmful in a system 
dominated by one party, such as South Africa.125 This is not to say that there 
is altogether no value in these institutions. They do have a role to play. The 
inherent weakness of this state-departmentalisation can, however, be denied 
or ignored only on pain of a serious loss of real constitutional quality in the 
constitutional order. Such order might eventually have the charming 
appearance of constitutionalism, yet be devoid of the substantive 
characteristics of constitutionalism in the sense that there are no real checks 
and balances, which are an essential element of constitutionalism, as 
concisely explained at the beginning of the article. 
If the structures of constitutionalism are state-departmentalised and therefore 
controlled by a single centralised source of power, (mutual) checks, controls, 
balances and limitation of power are fatally flawed. Then remains but the hope 
that the single source of power will constrain itself. That hope, however, does 
not spring from the existence of the necessary structures of constitutionalism 
but from the opposite, namely from its demise. 
A multitude of sources of power in a relationship of mutual balance can be 
sustained only if each within that variety is rooted in its own communal identity 
and is keen to rule itself, each in its own distinctive way. If communities, 
                                            
124  See Malan 2014 PELJ 1965-2040. 
125  This is how South Africa is now viewed by various observers in political science and in 
public law. See for example Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001 Democratization 
161-182; Southall 2005 Africa Spectrum 61-82; Choudhry 2009 CCR 5-19. 
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conscious of their distinctive identities and interests, are absent, the impetus 
for self-government would obviously also be absent and then there cannot be 
a dispensation comprising a multitude of centres of power, which is the first 
prerequisite for constitutionalism based on mutual checks, balances, controls 
and the limitation of power. A multitude of different communal identities is 
therefore the essential life blood for a multitude of centres of political power 
and authority for constitutionalism. That is what fertilises the ground for 
constitutionalism. Without it the chances for genuine constitutionalism are 
slender at best. 
It is against this background that the programmes of homogenisation referred 
to above, which are so prominent within statist theory and practice, should be 
viewed. Homogenisation kills the multitude of communal identities and also the 
urge for self-government.  In consequence any possibility of a multitude of 
centres of power, which is the first and essential prerequisite for 
constitutionalism, will fall away. From a constitutional point of view, these 
programmes should be viewed with utter disdain, because without the 
heterogeneity sustained by a multitude of communities and centres of self-
government, constitutionalism is gravely imperilled. Without that, 
constitutionalism wastes away to an impoverished order of state-
departmentalisation. In the modern centralised and homogenised territorial 
state, constitutionalism struggles to be more than that. Althusius' republican 
federalism can help to show the way to a better and more genuine 
constitutionalism beyond the constraints of statism. 
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